Trump UN Speech 2026: 8 Experts Debate His Foreign Policy

Introduction

Trump at the United Nations: Strength, Action, or a Dangerous Direction?

Donald Trump’s September 2026 address to the United Nations was more than a catalogue of American actions abroad. Taken together, his remarks on Iran, Venezuela, drug cartels, Greenland, NATO, international institutions, immigration, military strength, and diplomacy raised a larger question:

Is a recognizable Trump foreign-policy doctrine emerging?

That question became the starting point for this Imaginary Talk.

To keep the discussion genuinely balanced, the conversation was built around four voices generally prepared to defend Trump’s approach and four prepared to challenge it. Yet they were not asked to behave as political teams.

Newt Gingrich, Mike Pompeo, Robert O’Brien, and Sebastian Gorka presented strong arguments for sovereignty, deterrence, burden sharing, military credibility, and Trump’s willingness to act when traditional diplomacy appears unable to produce results.

John Bolton, Susan Rice, Ben Rhodes, and Anne Applebaum challenged different parts of that approach from very different directions. Their objections ranged from unclear strategic objectives and the risks of military escalation to allied trust, international institutions, and the durability of agreements.

Ian Bremmer served as moderator with one central rule:

Judge the policy, not the political identity of the person who created it.

That rule produced something more interesting than a conventional Trump-versus-anti-Trump debate.

Bolton sometimes agreed with Trump’s willingness to use force but questioned where that force was leading.

Rhodes accepted that military force can sometimes be necessary but questioned the threshold for using it.

Rice acknowledged that Trump has a legitimate argument when he demands greater defense contributions from allies.

Applebaum recognized that Trump has forced Europe to confront weaknesses in its own defense capabilities.

Trump’s defenders made concessions of their own.

Gingrich acknowledged that immediate breakthroughs should not automatically be declared permanent victories.

Pompeo accepted that pressure without a clear objective can produce escalation rather than strategic gain.

O’Brien recognized that higher allied defense spending would not constitute complete success if America simultaneously lost political influence.

Gorka acknowledged that killing cartel leaders means little if drugs, violence, and American deaths do not materially decline.

The conversation gradually moved away from personalities and toward a harder question:

What evidence should Americans eventually use to decide whether these policies worked?

(Note: This is an imaginary conversation, a creative exploration of an idea, and not a real speech or event.) 

Topic 1: What Foreign-Policy Doctrine Emerges From Trump’s UN Speech?

Ian Bremmer (Moderator):
I want to begin without asking whether Donald Trump’s foreign policy is good or bad. That question comes later, and different people around this table will answer it differently.

I want something harder.

After listening to this UN speech, what exactly is the foreign-policy doctrine?

Newt, the article that helped inspire this conversation argues that this may have been the most comprehensive presentation of a Trump doctrine we have yet seen. You agree with that basic proposition. Define it without giving me a campaign speech.

Newt Gingrich:
I would put it in three words: sovereignty, strength, and action.

Trump believes nations exist to protect their citizens. He doesn’t begin with an international institution and ask what America is permitted to do. He begins with American interests and asks what tools are available to protect them.

The second element is strength. Economic strength, military strength, energy strength, technological strength. He believes diplomacy becomes much more effective when the person sitting across the table knows you possess options you are actually prepared to use.

And the third is action.

That was the striking feature of this speech. Venezuela wasn't theoretical. Iran wasn't theoretical. The cartels weren't theoretical. NATO spending wasn't theoretical. Greenland wasn't theoretical.

You can disagree with individual actions, but this was a president essentially saying, "Here is what I have done."

Susan Rice:
I think that's a fair description of how Trump sees it.

Where I would differ is in assuming that action itself demonstrates strategy.

A doctrine needs more than a willingness to act. It needs an organizing principle that tells you when not to act.

That's one of the questions I had listening to the speech.

Iran requires military action. Venezuela requires military action. Cartels may require military action. Greenland requires intense pressure. Russia requires economic leverage. International institutions should have less authority.

What is the limiting principle?

Robert O'Brien:
American interests.

Rice:
But every administration says that.

O'Brien:
Of course. The disagreement concerns how you define them.

Trump is actually more selective than the rhetoric sometimes makes him sound.

Take NATO. His position isn't that NATO should disappear. It's almost the reverse. He wants NATO militarily capable of defending NATO.

For years, American presidents asked Europeans to spend more on defense. Trump applied much greater pressure.

You can object to the method. But if European countries substantially increase defense expenditures, you have to include that result when evaluating the method.

Ben Rhodes:
I agree with that last sentence.

If you're evaluating Trump fairly, you should count outcomes you don't like politically.

But the reverse has to apply too.

If pressure produces an immediate concession but leaves an ally less confident in America's reliability, that consequence counts as well.

One of my problems with the phrase "action versus talk" is that diplomacy itself is an action.

Preventing a war is an action.

Maintaining an alliance for forty years without firing a shot is an action.

We shouldn't define action so narrowly that military force, tariffs, or public threats count as action, but quiet diplomacy doesn't.

Mike Pompeo:
That's fair, Ben, but there is another side.

Diplomacy can become a substitute for solving a problem.

Governments can negotiate for years.

They can issue communiqués.

They can hold another summit.

Meanwhile, an adversary continues building missiles, enriching uranium, funding armed groups, or expanding military capacity.

At some point you have to ask whether the diplomatic process is producing a result or simply producing another meeting.

Trump has very little patience for process without outcomes.

John Bolton:
And sometimes not enough patience for defining the outcome.

That's my concern.

I agree with Mike that endless diplomacy can become an excuse for inaction. I probably agree with that more strongly than several people sitting on this side of the table.

But military strength is a means.

Tariffs are a means.

Sanctions are a means.

Negotiation is a means.

The question is: What is the objective?

If you don't define the objective clearly, unpredictability can confuse your adversary, but it can confuse your allies and your own government too.

Sebastian Gorka:
But John, ambiguity can be useful.

If an adversary knows precisely what America will never do, you have already given him valuable information.

One of Trump's advantages is that hostile governments cannot safely assume his threat is rhetorical.

That changes calculations.

Bolton:
Tactical ambiguity, yes.

Strategic ambiguity about your own objective, no.

Those are different things.

Gorka:
Agreed. But I don't think Trump's strategic objective is particularly mysterious.

Protect Americans.

Secure the homeland.

Prevent hostile states from obtaining capabilities that threaten us.

Make allies carry a fair share of collective defense.

Keep hostile forces away from the Western Hemisphere.

Maintain American technological superiority.

Where is the mystery?

Anne Applebaum:
The question isn't whether those objectives sound reasonable. Almost every American president could endorse most of that list.

The disagreement is over the method and the longer-term system those methods create.

American influence has historically depended on something unusual.

The United States is enormously strong, but many countries have voluntarily aligned themselves with it.

That is a different form of influence from compelling governments to cooperate since they fear economic or military consequences.

Gingrich:
But those aren't mutually exclusive.

Applebaum:
No, they aren't.

Gingrich:
And that's important.

Sometimes listening to discussions of Trump, you would think the choice is either friendship or strength.

The United States can have allies and still tell those allies, "You have responsibilities."

It can negotiate with Iran and still destroy facilities it considers dangerous.

It can work through the UN Security Council when the institution is useful and reject another international body when America believes that body is exceeding its legitimate authority.

That may look inconsistent if your starting point is preserving institutions.

It looks much more consistent if your starting point is sovereignty.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's stay there.

Maybe sovereignty is the organizing idea.

Susan, does that make the doctrine more coherent in your view?

Rice:
It makes it easier to describe.

Trump's conception seems to be that sovereign states are the primary legitimate actors, international institutions are useful when they help sovereign states accomplish agreed objectives, and those institutions become problematic when they acquire authority that constrains national decision-making.

That's coherent.

My disagreement concerns what happens when every major country adopts that logic aggressively.

The United States isn't the only sovereign country.

China can invoke sovereignty.

Russia can invoke sovereignty.

Iran can invoke sovereignty.

Smaller countries can invoke sovereignty against us.

So you need rules governing what happens when sovereign interests collide.

Pompeo:
Certainly.

But rules without enforcement aren't much protection.

Rice:
And strength without rules isn't much of an international order.

Pompeo:
That's the real disagreement.

Ian Bremmer:
Good. Let's make that disagreement explicit.

Is Trump's worldview trying to dismantle the international order, or renegotiate the terms under which America participates in it?

O'Brien:
Renegotiate.

Look at the speech itself.

He didn't come to the United Nations and say, "Abolish the United Nations."

He praised the Security Council where cooperation worked.

He thanked countries helping in Gaza.

He talked about NATO becoming stronger.

He praised cooperation with Mexico.

He discussed agreements with Denmark and Greenland.

That isn't isolationism.

It is international engagement with much greater emphasis on national sovereignty and reciprocity.

Rhodes:
I agree that calling Trump an isolationist is inaccurate.

In fact, look at the policies described in this speech.

American forces in Iran.

American forces involved with Venezuela.

Military action against cartels.

A larger presence in Greenland.

Pressure concerning Cuba.

Deep involvement in Gaza.

Negotiations involving Russia and Ukraine.

That's an extraordinarily active American foreign policy.

Bolton:
Exactly.

People keep trying to fit Trump into "isolationist" or "internationalist."

Neither works particularly well.

Gingrich:
I'd call it nationalist internationalism.

Rice:
That's an interesting phrase.

Gingrich:
America participates extensively in the world, but it does so primarily as a sovereign nation pursuing identifiable American interests, rather than as the administrator of an abstract global system.

Applebaum:
But then we need to ask whether the system itself is an American interest.

That's where I think the debate becomes much deeper.

After World War II, American policymakers concluded that alliances, international institutions, trade relationships, and predictable rules weren't acts of charity.

They believed those things benefited America.

So when we say "American interest versus international system," we may be creating a distinction that doesn't always exist.

Sometimes preserving the system is an American interest.

Pompeo:
And sometimes preserving an institution becomes more important than asking whether it's still doing its job.

Both can be true.

Ian Bremmer:
Now we're getting somewhere.

Let me move to the second question.

Trump repeatedly says, in different forms, "Others talked. I acted."

Newt sees that as one of the defining characteristics of this presidency.

Ben says diplomacy is action too.

So what should actually count as successful action?

Gingrich:
Results.

Rhodes:
Over what period?

Gingrich:
That's a legitimate question.

Rhodes:
It's not a small one.

If you use enormous pressure to produce an agreement that collapses eighteen months later, was it successful?

If you negotiate an agreement that looks weak initially but prevents war for twenty years, was that successful?

Foreign policy has a time horizon problem.

Gingrich:
Absolutely.

And this is where Trump's supporters have to be disciplined too.

You cannot claim every immediate breakthrough as permanent victory.

Some things have to prove themselves.

Bolton:
That's exactly right.

A ceasefire isn't peace.

Destroying a weapons facility isn't eliminating the strategic threat.

Removing a leader isn't creating a stable government.

Signing an agreement isn't implementing it.

Those distinctions matter regardless of who is president.

O'Brien:
Agreed.

But we can't create an impossible standard either.

No president controls what happens ten years after leaving office.

A policy can succeed under one administration and later be abandoned or reversed.

You have to judge what the policy achieved under the conditions that existed at the time.

Rice:
True, but durability has to count for something.

O'Brien:
Certainly.

Ian Bremmer:
Sebastian, where does unpredictability fit into all this?

Trump clearly values it.

Is unpredictability a doctrine?

Gorka:
No. It's a tool.

And people misunderstand it.

You don't want your allies wondering whether America will defend them tomorrow.

But you absolutely want a hostile actor wondering whether crossing a line could produce consequences much larger than expected.

Predictability can become exploitable.

Applebaum:
The problem is separating those audiences.

A statement intended to frighten Tehran is heard in Warsaw.

A threat intended to pressure one government is heard by twenty allies.

Presidents don't communicate privately with adversaries when they speak at the United Nations. The entire world hears the same words.

Gorka:
True.

Applebaum:
So strategic ambiguity has costs.

Pompeo:
It does. Predictability has costs too.

Ian Bremmer:
John, give me the strongest version of Trump's argument about unpredictability.

Not your criticism. His argument.

Bolton:
The strongest version is straightforward.

If an adversary believes an American president follows a fixed escalation ladder and will not move beyond certain predetermined responses, that adversary can calculate how much aggression is safe.

Trump wants to disrupt that calculation.

There is strategic value in that.

My concern begins when uncertainty about tactics becomes uncertainty about objectives.

Ian Bremmer:
Ben, strongest argument for Trump's preference for action?

Rhodes:
Governments can become prisoners of process.

Officials can convince themselves that maintaining negotiations is equivalent to solving the underlying problem.

Bureaucracies can become risk-averse.

And there are moments when refusing to act carries greater risks than acting.

I don't think Trump is wrong about that.

My disagreement is over where he draws the threshold.

Ian Bremmer:
Mike, strongest argument against Trump's approach?

Pompeo:
If pressure becomes an end in itself rather than a means to a clearly defined objective, you can create escalation without strategic gain.

Strength needs purpose.

Ian Bremmer:
Newt?

Gingrich:
Personalized diplomacy can achieve things institutional diplomacy cannot.

But if too much depends upon one individual's relationships and negotiating instincts, you have to ask how the system functions when that individual is gone.

That's a legitimate question about Trumpism beyond Trump.

Ian Bremmer:
Susan, strongest argument for Trump's approach?

Rice:
He is correct that allies and institutions should not be exempt from accountability simply since they are allies and institutions.

An alliance has obligations.

An international institution should demonstrate usefulness.

Past practice isn't automatically sufficient justification for future policy.

Ian Bremmer:
Robert, strongest concern?

O'Brien:
The United States has extraordinary capabilities, but they're finite.

A strong foreign policy still requires prioritization.

If everything becomes vital, nothing is prioritized.

Ian Bremmer:
Sebastian?

Gorka:
Force can destroy an immediate threat. It cannot automatically create the political conditions that follow.

Military success and political success aren't identical.

Ian Bremmer:
Anne, strongest argument for Trump's approach?

Applebaum:
He forces institutions and governments to confront assumptions they may have stopped questioning.

Sometimes disruption exposes genuine complacency.

The fact that the method is uncomfortable doesn't automatically mean the underlying question is illegitimate.

Ian Bremmer:
John?

Bolton:
Trump understands something many policymakers prefer not to say publicly: diplomacy works differently when the other side believes you are prepared to walk away or use coercive measures.

That's real.

But again, leverage needs an objective.

Ian Bremmer:
Then perhaps we have our first answer.

There appears to be a Trump doctrine, but it isn't simply "America First," and it isn't simply "peace through strength."

It seems to contain several connected propositions: national sovereignty comes before supranational authority; American military and economic strength should create leverage rather than merely reassurance; allies should contribute materially to collective security; adversaries should face uncertainty about the consequences of aggression; international institutions are instruments rather than ends in themselves; and negotiation remains available, including after confrontation.

Where this table divides is less over whether those elements exist than over how far they should be taken, what constrains them, and how their results should be measured.

Gingrich:
That's fair.

Rice:
Yes.

Rhodes:
I'd accept that description.

O'Brien:
So would I.

Bolton:
With the word "objective" written in very large letters somewhere.

Gorka:
And "deterrence" beside it.

Applebaum:
And "durability."

Pompeo:
Then we've already got a more useful doctrine than most government documents.

Ian Bremmer:
Maybe that's the right place to leave this question. A doctrine isn't proved by how impressive it sounds at the United Nations. Nor is it disproved simply because it breaks with convention.

Its meaning becomes clearer when we apply it to an actual decision where the stakes include nuclear weapons, military force, regime survival, diplomacy, and the possibility of another war.

Iran gives us exactly that test.

Topic 2: Iran: What Should American Strength Be Trying to Achieve?

This is an imagined discussion based on the participants' documented public positions, not a transcript of statements they actually made.

Ian Bremmer (Moderator):
Iran may be the hardest test of the doctrine we just described.

President Trump told the United Nations that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon has been one of his consistent objectives. His administration points to Operation Midnight Hammer against nuclear facilities and Operation Epic Fury as evidence that the United States was prepared to use military force when diplomacy failed. Yet Trump stood at the UN this week still talking about the possibility of an agreement with Tehran. Reuters reported yesterday that the United States and Iran remain far apart, though both sides continue diplomatic efforts. (The White House)

So I don't want to begin with, "Was Trump right?"

I want to begin somewhere more basic.

What should the United States actually be trying to achieve with Iran?

Mike?

Mike Pompeo:
The minimum objective is clear.

Iran cannot possess a nuclear weapon.

That isn't merely an Israeli security concern. It changes the strategic structure of the Middle East.

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, other governments have to reconsider their own security. Every military confrontation with Iran becomes more dangerous. Iran's ability to support armed groups abroad exists beneath a nuclear umbrella.

So the first objective has to be preventing that outcome.

Ben Rhodes:
I agree with the objective.

And that matters.

One danger in political discussions is pretending the disagreement is between people who want Iran to have nuclear weapons and people who don't.

That's not the disagreement.

The disagreement is about the safest and most durable method of preventing it.

Sebastian Gorka:
Good.

Then we already have something substantial in common.

But here's the question for you, Ben.

Suppose negotiations continue. Suppose Iran delays. Suppose inspectors encounter problems. Suppose intelligence indicates facilities are being rebuilt.

At what point does diplomacy become permission to continue?

Rhodes:
That's a legitimate question.

But I can reverse it.

Suppose you bomb the facilities.

Then what?

You can destroy centrifuges.

You can destroy buildings.

You can kill scientists.

Can you destroy the knowledge?

Gorka:
No.

Rhodes:
Exactly.

So military action can set a program back. It cannot erase the scientific knowledge required to rebuild it.

That means even after military action, you're eventually back at verification, inspections, intelligence and diplomacy.

Pompeo:
Yes.

But possibly from a very different negotiating position.

That's the part critics sometimes leave out.

Military action doesn't necessarily replace diplomacy.

It can alter the conditions under which diplomacy takes place.

Susan Rice:
It can.

We should concede that.

Force and diplomacy aren't mutually exclusive.

But Mike, there's another possibility. Military action can convince the Iranian leadership that the only permanent protection against future American attacks is precisely the thing we're trying to prevent them from acquiring.

A nuclear weapon.

That's the strategic risk.

Robert O'Brien:
And doing nothing can produce the opposite lesson.

That America issues warnings indefinitely and never enforces them.

We have to consider both incentives.

John Bolton:
We're still avoiding the central issue.

What is the problem?

Is the problem the Iranian nuclear program?

Is it Iran's missile capability?

Is it support for terrorist organizations?

Is it attacks on shipping?

Is it the regime itself?

Those aren't identical objectives.

You cannot develop a coherent strategy until you decide which problem you're solving.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's test that.

Newt, suppose tomorrow Iran agreed to a highly intrusive verification system, abandoned any nuclear-weapons pathway, stopped threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and sharply reduced support for armed groups outside Iran.

Same government.

No regime change.

Would you take that deal?

Newt Gingrich:
If the agreement were genuinely verifiable and enforceable?

Yes.

I think you'd have to consider it very seriously.

The purpose of American foreign policy isn't to produce governments around the world that Americans admire.

The question is whether that government poses an unacceptable threat to American interests and our allies.

Bolton:
And that's where Newt and I disagree.

Gingrich:
I know.

Bolton:
If you believe the regime itself generates these behaviors, then you're treating symptoms.

You eliminate one nuclear facility, they build another.

You restrict one proxy network, another emerges.

You reach an agreement, the regime searches for ways around it.

At some point you have to ask whether the nature of the government is the strategic problem.

Rhodes:
And this is where I think John's position has to answer a much harder question.

Let's say you're correct.

Let's say the regime is the problem.

How do you change it?

Bolton:
You support its opponents. You weaken the regime's ability to repress them. You impose economic and political pressure. You don't rescue the regime diplomatically when it is vulnerable.

Rhodes:
But suppose it still survives.

Do American troops remove it?

Bolton:
Not necessarily.

Rhodes:
That's the word I'm interested in.

"Necessarily."

We've seen this movie before.

Removing a government is one decision.

What happens the morning after is another.

Bolton:
And the lesson from previous failures shouldn't be that hostile regimes must remain forever.

Rhodes:
I didn't say that.

I'm asking who governs Iran afterward.

Iran has roughly ninety million people, numerous ethnic and political divisions, powerful security institutions, armed factions and a complicated political history.

"Regime change" sounds like an endpoint.

It's actually the beginning of another problem.

Gorka:
Ben has a legitimate point there.

Bolton:
Of course he does.

Ian Bremmer:
Sebastian, you're agreeing with Rhodes?

Gorka:
On that point, yes.

Destroying an enemy's military capability and building a functioning political order are completely different tasks.

Americans learned that at enormous cost.

But I don't accept the conclusion that since the aftermath is difficult, the United States should tolerate a growing strategic threat.

Those are two separate questions.

Rice:
That's an important distinction.

There's another distinction I'd add.

Wanting political change inside Iran is different from America imposing that change.

Iranians themselves may deeply oppose their government. That's their political future.

The United States should be extremely careful about assuming it can design another country's political order from Washington.

Pompeo:
But Susan, there's a danger in taking that principle too far.

A regime can say, "This is an internal matter," even as it develops capabilities that threaten countries outside its borders.

Sovereignty isn't immunity.

Rice:
Agreed.

If the threat crosses borders, America has legitimate interests.

But the remedy should match the threat.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's get directly to the hardest argument for Trump's approach.

The administration says diplomacy was attempted, Iran rejected agreements, nuclear capabilities continued, military force followed, and now negotiations are occurring under much greater American leverage. That is the administration's "peace through strength" case. (The White House)

Robert, make that case as strongly as you can.

O'Brien:
Imagine you're sitting in Tehran.

Before military action, you may believe you have time.

You negotiate.

You delay.

You make partial concessions.

You calculate that Washington doesn't want another Middle Eastern war.

Then America demonstrates that its military option is real.

Your calculation changes.

Now when an American negotiator says, "This is the final offer," those words carry information they didn't carry before.

That doesn't mean every bombing campaign produces diplomacy.

It means credible force can change the bargaining environment.

Applebaum:
I think that's the strongest argument for what Trump has done.

But there's a corresponding question.

How does Tehran interpret the same event?

Perhaps exactly as Robert describes.

Or perhaps Iranian leaders conclude:

"We made a terrible mistake by not obtaining nuclear weapons sooner."

If they draw the second lesson, tactical military success could create a long-term proliferation incentive.

Pompeo:
Which is why you don't simply bomb something and go home.

Pressure has to remain credible.

Verification has to be meaningful.

The consequences of cheating have to be understood.

Applebaum:
Then we're actually moving toward something less different from traditional diplomacy than it initially sounds.

Pompeo:
No problem with that.

I have never believed diplomacy is weakness.

Bad diplomacy is weakness.

Diplomacy disconnected from leverage is frequently ineffective.

Rice:
And leverage disconnected from diplomacy can become endless escalation.

Pompeo:
That's fair.

Ian Bremmer:
Now I want to address the uncomfortable question Newt himself raised.

Trump's UN speech described the Iranian government in exceptionally severe terms. At the same time, Trump is contemplating an agreement.

Newt, your question is essentially:

"If the government is really this dangerous, why negotiate with it?"

So answer your own question.

Gingrich:
You negotiate with dangerous governments precisely since they're dangerous.

Ronald Reagan negotiated with the Soviet Union.

American presidents have negotiated with governments they considered hostile throughout history.

Negotiation isn't moral approval.

The question is whether the agreement makes Americans safer.

My concern would be fooling ourselves about who we're negotiating with.

If you believe the Iranian regime fundamentally changed since it signed a document, you're taking an enormous risk.

If you say, "We don't trust you, which is exactly why this agreement contains verification and consequences," that's different.

Bolton:
But there comes a point where repeated agreements buy the regime time.

Gingrich:
Possibly.

Bolton:
And if that's what happens?

Gingrich:
Then the agreement failed.

Bolton:
And we're back where we started.

Gingrich:
Not necessarily.

If Iran's nuclear capability has been substantially reduced and the United States has gained several years without a nuclear Iran, those years aren't meaningless.

Bolton:
Unless Iran uses them to prepare more effectively for the next confrontation.

Rhodes:
But John, your argument has the same problem.

Suppose you replace the regime.

What if the replacement government wants nuclear weapons too?

Nuclear technology doesn't belong to one political faction.

Iranian nationalism doesn't disappear with the current government.

Bolton:
Correct.

Rhodes:
So regime change doesn't automatically solve proliferation either.

Bolton:
No strategy gives you a permanent guarantee.

That's exactly why I keep coming back to objectives rather than slogans.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's introduce the Iranian perspective, not since anyone here represents Tehran, but since strategy fails if you don't consider what the other actor believes.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told the UN yesterday that Iran would not surrender under American pressure but remained open to diplomacy. Reuters reports that Iranian and American officials remain far apart over ending the conflict. (Reuters)

Sebastian, if pressure makes Iran more defiant rather than more accommodating, when do you know the strategy isn't working?

Gorka:
When behavior doesn't change.

That's the measurement.

Not speeches.

Governments say defiant things publicly all the time.

You look at capabilities.

You look at financing.

You look at weapons development.

You look at shipping.

You look at whether attacks occur.

You look at what happens at the negotiating table.

Rice:
Good. Then we should apply exactly that standard in both directions.

Trump saying an operation was successful doesn't establish success either.

Look at behavior and measurable outcomes.

Gorka:
Agreed.

Ian Bremmer:
That may be one of the cleanest points of agreement we've had.

Ian Bremmer:
Now let's make this difficult for everyone.

I'm going to give you a hypothetical agreement.

Iran accepts permanent international monitoring of declared nuclear facilities.

Highly enriched uranium is removed or rendered unusable.

Limits are imposed on enrichment.

The Strait of Hormuz fully reopens.

Iran reduces support for armed organizations outside its borders.

The United States gradually removes sanctions if Iran complies.

No regime change.

No requirement that Iran become democratic.

If Iran violates the agreement, sanctions return and military options remain available.

Mike?

Pompeo:
The details of verification would decide it, but conceptually, yes. I'd negotiate.

Rice:
Yes.

O'Brien:
Yes, if verification is rigorous.

Rhodes:
Yes.

Gorka:
With very aggressive inspection rights.

Gingrich:
Yes.

Applebaum:
Yes, assuming enforcement is credible.

Ian Bremmer:
John?

Bolton:
I'd be extraordinarily skeptical.

Ian Bremmer:
But not automatically no?

Bolton:
I would need to know whether the agreement actually removes the threat or merely postpones it.

And I would not pretend the other destabilizing activities of the regime disappear simply since the nuclear file has been addressed.

Ian Bremmer:
Interesting.

Seven conditional yeses and one deeply skeptical maybe.

That suggests the disagreement around this table isn't whether diplomacy should exist.

It's about what must happen before diplomacy becomes trustworthy.

Rhodes:
And how much destruction occurs before you get there.

Pompeo:
And what happens if diplomacy never gets there.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's reverse the hypothetical.

Iran refuses meaningful inspections.

Intelligence shows renewed work toward a weapon.

Diplomacy repeatedly fails.

Sanctions fail to stop the program.

American intelligence assesses that Iran is approaching an irreversible nuclear threshold.

Is military force justified?

Ben?

Rhodes:
Potentially, yes.

But that is an extraordinarily high threshold.

I'd want the intelligence tested rigorously, alternatives exhausted, allies consulted, objectives defined and the consequences examined.

Gorka:
But you said yes.

Rhodes:
I said potentially yes.

I'm not a pacifist.

Rice:
Same answer.

Military force has a legitimate place in foreign policy. The burden for using it should be high.

Applebaum:
Agreed.

Bolton:
Yes.

Pompeo:
Yes.

O'Brien:
Yes.

Gingrich:
Yes.

Gorka:
Absolutely.

Ian Bremmer:
Then once again, the disagreement is narrower than American political rhetoric often suggests.

Everyone at this table accepts diplomacy.

Everyone accepts that military force can be legitimate under at least some conditions.

The disagreement is about thresholds, objectives, trust, verification, escalation and what comes afterward.

Gingrich:
And that's where I think Trump deserves a fair hearing.

The simplistic description would be that he's either a warmonger or an isolationist.

Neither fits.

He is willing to use tremendous military force.

Then he's willing to negotiate with the same government.

That seems contradictory only if you believe force and diplomacy belong to separate philosophies.

Trump doesn't.

Rhodes:
That's fair as a description.

But whether combining them this way produces lasting security is precisely what remains unresolved.

Bolton:
And whether the negotiation sacrifices an objective that military action made achievable.

Rice:
Or whether continuing military action sacrifices an agreement that could make further fighting unnecessary.

Pompeo:
Which is exactly the decision presidents get paid to make.

Ian Bremmer:
Then perhaps we shouldn't finish Iran by declaring that force worked or diplomacy failed, since as of September 24, 2026, the story isn't finished. Negotiations continue, and Reuters reports substantial differences remain between Washington and Tehran. (Reuters)

Instead, I want each of you to answer one sentence.

What should victory mean?

Pompeo:
An Iran that cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and understands that threatening America or its allies carries unacceptable costs.

Rice:
A verifiable nuclear settlement, greater regional stability and an outcome that doesn't require another major war.

Bolton:
Eliminating the strategic threat rather than repeatedly postponing it.

Rhodes:
Preventing nuclear proliferation without trapping another generation of Americans in an unnecessary Middle Eastern conflict.

O'Brien:
A durable arrangement in which deterrence makes violations more costly than compliance.

Applebaum:
An outcome that survives after the personalities who negotiated it have left office.

Gorka:
An America whose enemies know its warnings are credible and whose military doesn't have to fight the same war repeatedly.

Gingrich:
An Iran that is no longer a serious threat to the United States and its allies, achieved at a cost America can sustain.

Ian Bremmer:
Those definitions aren't identical.

But notice something important.

Nobody defined victory as bombing Iran.

Nobody defined victory as signing a piece of paper.

Force is not victory.

Negotiation is not victory.

Regime change by itself is not victory.

The real test is what exists afterward: Iran's capabilities, Iran's behavior, the security of its neighbors, the safety of Americans, the credibility of agreements, and whether another war becomes less necessary rather than more.

Perhaps that's the hardest lesson Iran imposes on every foreign-policy doctrine.

Strength matters. But the purpose of strength has to be an outcome worth sustaining.

Topic 3: Cartels, Venezuela, and Security in the Western Hemisphere

This is an imagined discussion based on the participants' documented public positions, not a transcript of statements they actually made.

Ian Bremmer (Moderator):
Let's move closer to home.

President Trump used some of the strongest language in his UN address when discussing the Western Hemisphere. He said the United States would no longer permit threats to America to gain a foothold anywhere in the region. He defended the capture of Nicolás Maduro, military strikes against drug-trafficking vessels, and the designation of cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. He described the cartels as the "ISIS of the Western Hemisphere." (The White House)

At the same time, this is not simply America acting alone. The administration has organized the Shield of the Americas coalition with several Latin American governments cooperating against transnational criminal organizations. Mexico, however, has explicitly rejected American military intervention on its territory. (Reuters)

So here's the question.

When does organized crime stop being primarily a police problem and become a national-security problem?

Sebastian?

Sebastian Gorka:
When the organization acquires the capabilities and behavior of an enemy.

Forget the label for a moment.

Suppose an organization controls territory. It has military-grade weapons. It assassinates public officials. It terrorizes civilians. It corrupts police departments and governments. It moves billions of dollars across borders. It traffics human beings and narcotics. Its activities result in enormous harm inside the United States.

At what point do we stop pretending that this is merely a collection of criminals who need to be arrested?

Ben Rhodes:
I agree with the first half of that argument more than you might expect.

These aren't ordinary street gangs.

The question is what follows from recognizing that.

Calling something a national-security threat doesn't automatically mean the military becomes the right instrument.

Gorka:
Why not?

Rhodes:
Sometimes it is.

But a cartel isn't ISIS.

ISIS had a political and religious ideology. It sought territorial control for a political project. Drug cartels primarily operate businesses.

Horrific businesses.

But businesses nonetheless.

That difference matters since the incentives are different.

Kill the leader of ISIS and perhaps you weaken an ideological movement.

Kill the head of a cartel and another person may take his place tomorrow since billions of dollars remain available.

Mike Pompeo:
That's a good distinction.

But I'm not sure it leads where you think it leads.

Profit can make an organization more resilient, not less dangerous.

If somebody is shooting at Americans, corrupting governments and moving lethal narcotics into your country, I don't find much comfort in learning that he's doing it for money rather than ideology.

Susan Rice:
But Ben's point isn't that the motivation makes the cartel harmless.

It's that the motivation changes the solution.

If you destroy a terrorist training camp, you've eliminated a military asset.

If you destroy a drug laboratory and demand remains enormous, another laboratory can appear.

You have to attack the financial system, trafficking network, corruption, weapons supply, money laundering and demand at the same time.

Gorka:
Fine.

Who said we shouldn't?

Rice:
Then we're closer than it sounds.

My concern is turning "cartels are a serious national-security threat" into "military force is the primary answer."

Those aren't the same proposition.

Ian Bremmer:
Newt, Trump's phrase "ISIS of the Western Hemisphere" is rhetorically powerful.

Is it analytically useful?

Newt Gingrich:
It can be, if you understand what he's trying to communicate.

I don't think Trump is giving a graduate seminar on the organizational differences between ISIS and a Mexican cartel.

He's saying: stop thinking of these organizations as conventional criminals.

They can become sufficiently violent, wealthy and territorially influential that normal law-enforcement assumptions don't work.

That's the useful part of the comparison.

John Bolton:
I agree with Newt there.

But we need to be precise.

Designating an organization as terrorist doesn't magically create a strategy for destroying it.

Intelligence matters.

Financial warfare matters.

Extradition matters.

Cooperation with foreign governments matters.

Military capabilities may matter.

The question isn't "police or military?"

It may require all of them.

Robert O'Brien:
Exactly.

And that's one reason regional cooperation matters.

The Trump administration's Shield of the Americas approach is important here. Several governments are cooperating against transnational criminal organizations. (Reuters)

That changes the sovereignty argument considerably.

There's a major difference between the United States invading a country against its government's wishes and the United States working with a government that requests intelligence, surveillance, maritime interception, training or other assistance.

Anne Applebaum:
I agree.

And I would separate those situations very sharply.

Cooperative security arrangements among sovereign governments are one thing.

Unilateral American military action inside another country is something else.

If we're going to make sovereignty one of the pillars of the Trump doctrine, as we did in Topic 1, then sovereignty can't mean American sovereignty matters enormously but Mexican sovereignty matters less.

Gorka:
Nobody said that.

Applebaum:
Good.

Then Mexico presents the difficult case.

President Claudia Sheinbaum has rejected American intervention inside Mexico. (Reuters)

Suppose Washington believes a cartel operating there represents an immediate threat to Americans.

Whose sovereignty prevails?

Gorka:
That's exactly why this isn't an easy question.

But sovereignty carries responsibilities too.

A government can't simply say, "You may not cross our border," and then permit an organization operating inside that border to attack your citizens indefinitely.

Rice:
"Permit" is doing a lot of work there.

There's a difference between unwilling and unable.

Gorka:
Absolutely.

Rice:
Then we need to preserve that distinction.

Mexico fighting cartels but struggling to defeat them is a very different situation from a government deliberately sheltering an organization attacking Americans.

Pompeo:
That's right.

And your response should reflect the difference.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's make the hypothetical difficult.

A cartel controls territory fifty miles south of the American border.

American intelligence knows the location of its leadership.

The organization is moving fentanyl and other drugs north.

It has killed Mexican officials.

The Mexican government is fighting it but tells Washington clearly:

No American military strikes inside Mexico.

What should the American president do?

Robert?

O'Brien:
First, intensify cooperation with Mexico.

Give them intelligence.

Help identify leadership.

Attack financial networks.

Intercept trafficking routes.

Provide technical capabilities they request.

There are many options before unilateral military action.

Ian Bremmer:
And if that fails?

O'Brien:
Then the president has to reassess the threat and available options.

But you don't begin by treating an allied neighbor's sovereignty casually.

Rhodes:
I agree completely.

Gorka:
So do I.

Ian Bremmer:
Sebastian, that's interesting.

People might expect you to say, "Strike immediately."

Gorka:
That's caricature.

Military force is a tool, not a personality test.

If Mexico is genuinely cooperating and fighting the same enemy, you work with Mexico.

But I won't say unilateral action is never justified.

Imagine intelligence shows a cartel is preparing an attack that will kill thousands of Americans tomorrow and the Mexican government cannot stop it.

Does an American president really say, "We knew exactly where they were, but sovereignty prevented us from acting"?

I don't think any president would want to explain that afterward.

Rice:
Under an imminent-threat scenario, the legal and strategic analysis changes dramatically.

But we shouldn't use an extreme hypothetical to justify a general policy of crossing borders whenever Washington believes another country isn't doing enough.

Bolton:
That's the key distinction.

Imminence matters.

Capability matters.

Intent matters.

Host-government cooperation matters.

You need criteria.

Otherwise "national security" becomes infinitely expandable.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's turn to Venezuela.

This is where the Trump doctrine moved beyond hypothetical military intervention.

The United States captured Nicolás Maduro in January after a military operation. The administration portrayed the operation as bringing Maduro to justice and reasserting American security interests in the hemisphere. Critics, including foreign governments and legal scholars, questioned the legality and precedent of forcibly seizing another country's leader. (Reuters)

Since then, Washington has engaged Venezuela's interim leadership, and Trump met interim President Delcy Rodríguez in New York this week. (Reuters)

Newt, supporters look at that and say: it worked.

Make the case.

Gingrich:
The strongest case isn't complicated.

Maduro is gone.

The United States demonstrated that there are consequences for hostile behavior in its own hemisphere.

Political prisoners have been released.

The United States and Venezuela are now talking.

There is economic engagement.

And other governments in the region have received a message that Washington is no longer indifferent to developments directly affecting American security.

If you're judging policy by results, you can't simply erase those outcomes since you dislike how they were achieved.

Applebaum:
I agree with the last sentence.

Positive outcomes count.

But the method counts too.

Gingrich:
Of course.

Applebaum:
Then here's my concern.

Imagine China announces that a government in Asia threatens Chinese security.

China enters that country, captures its leader and transports that person to Beijing for prosecution.

What principle does Washington invoke to object?

Pompeo:
The facts.

Applebaum:
Explain.

Pompeo:
International affairs aren't geometry.

Two operations aren't equivalent merely since both involve crossing a border.

You examine the threat.

You examine the government's behavior.

You examine treaty obligations.

You examine criminal activity.

You examine regional security.

You examine available alternatives.

Applebaum:
I agree that facts matter.

But precedents matter too.

If America's argument becomes simply "we determined this was necessary," other major powers can use identical language.

Bolton:
That's a serious concern.

But let's not pretend international law has ever prevented major powers from invoking self-defense when they believe vital interests are threatened.

The question for American policymakers is whether the objective justified the risk and whether the aftermath improved America's strategic position.

Rhodes:
And whether the aftermath remains stable.

We're nine months removed from Maduro's capture, not twenty years.

I think this is where Newt's point from Topic 1 should govern us.

Don't call every immediate breakthrough a permanent success.

Gingrich:
I agree.

Rhodes:
That's important.

Venezuela could become significantly freer and more prosperous.

It could stabilize.

Or political conflict could return.

We don't know yet.

Gingrich:
Correct.

But uncertainty about the future doesn't erase what has happened so far.

Rhodes:
Agreed.

That's fair.

Ian Bremmer:
This may be another place where the two sides are closer than political rhetoric suggests.

Let me test that.

Suppose five years from now Venezuela has competitive elections, substantially fewer political prisoners, increased oil production, growing incomes, reduced migration and peaceful relations with its neighbors.

Would the critics around this table acknowledge that the Venezuela operation produced major positive results?

Susan?

Rice:
Yes.

I'd still examine the legality and precedent, but positive outcomes would be positive outcomes.

Rhodes:
Yes.

Applebaum:
Certainly.

Bolton:
Of course.

Ian Bremmer:
Now reverse it.

Five years from now Venezuela is unstable. Armed factions are competing. American forces remain involved. Oil production has disappointed. Another authoritarian government has emerged.

Would Trump's supporters acknowledge that the operation failed strategically?

Pompeo:
Yes.

O'Brien:
Yes.

Gorka:
Yes.

Gingrich:
Absolutely.

Ian Bremmer:
Good.

Then we have a measurement that doesn't depend entirely on partisan identity.

Ian Bremmer:
But I want to push deeper.

Trump's UN speech appears to be reviving an old American idea in modern form: the Western Hemisphere has special strategic importance to the United States. Reuters describes the administration as embracing a revived Monroe Doctrine approach, sometimes called the "Donroe Doctrine." (Reuters)

John, is that legitimate?

Bolton:
Of course the Western Hemisphere has special strategic importance.

Geography hasn't disappeared.

A hostile military presence five thousand miles away is different from one five hundred miles away.

China understands this.

Russia understands this.

Every serious power understands geography.

The United States would be foolish not to.

Rice:
I agree with the geography.

I don't agree that geographic importance grants Washington unlimited authority over neighboring countries.

Bolton:
Neither do I.

Rice:
Good.

Then the principle should be:

America has unusually strong security interests in the hemisphere, but Latin American countries remain sovereign states rather than components of an American security zone.

O'Brien:
I can accept that formulation.

Gorka:
With one addition.

Sovereignty cannot become a shield behind which hostile powers or transnational organizations build capabilities threatening the United States.

Applebaum:
Then apply that principle symmetrically.

If Latin American countries say American activities threaten their security, they have legitimate interests too.

Gorka:
Certainly.

That doesn't mean every claim is equally valid.

Applebaum:
Agreed.

Ian Bremmer:
Now let's return to the cartels, since Venezuela and cartels aren't the same problem.

Suppose Trump succeeds militarily.

Cartel leaders are killed or captured.

Drug boats are destroyed.

Trafficking routes are disrupted.

Yet American demand for illegal drugs remains enormous.

What happens?

Rhodes:
That's the weakness in a purely supply-side strategy.

The profit remains.

If the profit remains, somebody wants the business.

You may destroy Cartel A and create the market opportunity for Cartel B.

Pompeo:
True.

But don't take that argument too far.

We don't respond to bank robbery by saying, "As long as people want money, another robber will appear."

Government still suppresses criminal organizations.

Rhodes:
Absolutely.

I'm not arguing for surrender.

I'm saying suppression is one part of the solution.

Rice:
And this is where domestic policy enters foreign policy.

Treatment.

Prevention.

Border security.

Prescription practices.

Law enforcement.

Financial intelligence.

Weapons trafficking.

Money laundering.

International cooperation.

You need several instruments simultaneously.

Gorka:
I don't disagree with any of that.

What Trump adds is something previous approaches sometimes lacked: fear.

Cartel leaders should fear the United States.

Applebaum:
Fear can deter.

But fear can produce adaptation too.

Organizations decentralize.

They change routes.

They recruit replacements.

They infiltrate governments more deeply.

So once again, the measurement has to be outcomes rather than dramatic operations.

Gorka:
Fine.

Measure the amount of narcotics entering America.

Measure overdose deaths.

Measure cartel revenue.

Measure territorial control.

Measure murders.

Measure corruption.

I'm comfortable being judged that way.

Ian Bremmer:
That's useful.

Ian Bremmer:
I want one final hypothetical.

Imagine the United States can reduce cartel drug trafficking into America by 80 percent through aggressive military operations, but doing so seriously damages relations with Mexico.

Or America can reduce trafficking by 50 percent through full cooperation with Mexico without violating Mexican sovereignty.

Which outcome do you choose?

Gorka:
You're leaving out time.

Ian Bremmer:
Five years.

Gorka:
Then I'd need to know what "seriously damages relations" means.

Ian Bremmer:
Mexico ends intelligence cooperation, reduces economic cooperation and begins seeking closer strategic relationships elsewhere.

Gorka:
Then 80 percent may not be the better outcome.

Rhodes:
That's important.

Gorka:
Why?

I said from the beginning that we're discussing national interest.

Destroying one threat while creating three others isn't intelligent strategy.

Rice:
Exactly.

Pompeo:
But your hypothetical works in reverse too.

If preserving a friendly diplomatic relationship means accepting tens of thousands of preventable American deaths, friendship isn't enough.

Rice:
Agreed.

O'Brien:
Which is why the objective should be cooperation strong enough that we don't have to make that choice.

Ian Bremmer:
Then perhaps this topic gives us another piece of the doctrine.

Trump's argument is that threats close to the United States should face a much lower tolerance threshold than they did previously. His administration has backed that view with cartel terrorist designations, military operations, Maduro's capture and a regional anti-cartel coalition. (The White House)

The strongest defense is straightforward:

A government has a fundamental obligation to protect its citizens. Borders should not provide permanent sanctuary to organizations capable of inflicting severe harm on Americans.

The strongest challenge is equally serious:

If America gives itself broad authority to cross borders whenever it defines something as a national-security threat, it risks weakening the sovereignty principle it claims to defend.

Gingrich:
That's the tension.

Applebaum:
And it cannot simply be wished away.

Bolton:
Nor can threats be wished away.

Rhodes:
Which means both sides need thresholds.

Pompeo:
And consequences.

Rice:
And cooperation.

Gorka:
And credibility.

O'Brien:
And measurable results.

Ian Bremmer:
Perhaps that's where the Western Hemisphere question really ends.

Not with "military force or diplomacy."

Not with "sovereignty or security."

A serious American policy has to protect its citizens and recognize that its neighbors are sovereign countries with citizens and interests of their own.

The hard question is what happens when those two responsibilities collide.

Topic 4: Greenland, NATO, the UN, and the Future of American Alliances

This is an imagined discussion based on the participants' documented public positions, not a transcript of statements they actually made.

Ian Bremmer (Moderator):
We've spent a lot of time discussing America's adversaries.

Now I want to ask what may be an even harder question:

How should the United States treat its friends?

President Trump's relationship with America's allies has always been unusual.

He can praise NATO and criticize NATO in the same speech. He can speak warmly about European leaders and then accuse their governments of failing to contribute enough to their own defense. He can criticize international organizations and then celebrate an agreement reached through international cooperation.

And Greenland gives us an extraordinary case study.

Only two days ago, President Trump, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen signed an agreement ending months of confrontation over Greenland. Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark, yet the agreement significantly expands America's military presence and security role there. Reuters reported that it provides for two permanent American military bases, expanded military access, and restrictions intended to prevent adversarial powers from gaining sensitive strategic positions in Greenland.

So I want to begin with the result.

Robert, if Trump wanted greater American security in Greenland and ultimately obtained greater American security in Greenland without acquiring Greenland, isn't that evidence his pressure worked?

Robert O'Brien:
It certainly belongs in the evidence.

The Arctic has become much more strategically important.

You have Russian military capabilities. You have Chinese interest in Arctic infrastructure and resources. You have shipping routes becoming increasingly important. Greenland sits in an extraordinary geographic position between North America and Europe.

The United States has legitimate strategic interests there.

Trump made those interests impossible to ignore.

Now we have an agreement that strengthens America's position without changing Greenland's sovereignty.

If we're judging results, that's significant.

Susan Rice:
It is.

I don't think fairness requires denying that.

The question is whether the same result could have been achieved without months of confrontation with Denmark and Greenland.

Newt Gingrich:
Maybe.

But that's unknowable.

Rice:
Exactly.

Which means supporters shouldn't automatically say the confrontation caused the agreement, and critics shouldn't automatically say the confrontation was unnecessary.

We can say what we know.

The relationship went through serious strain.

Then negotiations produced an agreement.

The argument is over whether the strain created leverage or created unnecessary costs along the way.

Mike Pompeo:
That's fair.

But there is a broader pattern here.

Trump has repeatedly concluded that polite requests often don't change behavior.

When he raises the cost of saying no, suddenly issues that sat unresolved for years become negotiable.

That doesn't mean every threat is wise.

It means pressure is part of negotiation.

Ben Rhodes:
And that's where I want to distinguish bargaining from alliance management.

If you're negotiating with an adversary, creating fear and uncertainty can be useful.

When you're negotiating with an ally, the calculation is different.

Your ally isn't merely thinking about this transaction.

They're thinking:

Can I depend on you during the next crisis?

That makes trust itself a strategic asset.

Ian Bremmer:
Newt, let's make this concrete.

Suppose Trump obtained 90 percent of what he wanted through confrontation.

Suppose another president could have obtained 75 percent through quiet negotiations without damaging the relationship.

Which is the better result?

Gingrich:
You can't answer without knowing what the missing 15 percent contains.

If that 15 percent determines whether China gains strategic access to Greenland, I take the 90 percent.

If it's largely symbolic, perhaps I take 75 percent.

Foreign policy isn't a customer-satisfaction survey.

You have to ask what America actually gained.

Anne Applebaum:
That's a good answer.

But there's another variable.

How much trust did you spend obtaining that extra 15 percent?

Trust isn't sentimental.

Governments make military decisions based on whether they believe other governments will honor commitments.

Gingrich:
True.

Applebaum:
So pressure has a price.

Sometimes that price is worth paying.

Sometimes it isn't.

My objection is to treating the final signed agreement as the only thing on the balance sheet.

Pompeo:
And my objection would be treating diplomatic discomfort as though it automatically outweighs strategic gains.

Applebaum:
Agreed.

Ian Bremmer:
That's a useful distinction.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's move to NATO.

President Trump has argued for years that European members should carry substantially more of the defense burden.

At the 2025 Hague summit, NATO allies committed to a new defense-investment target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035, with 3.5 percent for core defense requirements and 1.5 percent for broader defense and security-related investments. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte publicly credited Trump with pushing allies toward higher spending.

John, you've spent much of your career arguing that NATO needs serious military capability.

Does Trump deserve credit here?

John Bolton:
He deserves credit for pressing allies on defense spending.

American presidents from both parties complained about burden sharing for decades.

Trump made it politically impossible for European governments to ignore.

I don't have difficulty acknowledging that.

My concern is that you can strengthen NATO's military budgets and weaken confidence in NATO's political commitment at the same time.

Those are separate measurements.

Sebastian Gorka:
But isn't capability the foundation of credibility?

An alliance that promises to defend thirty countries but lacks the ammunition, personnel, aircraft, ships and industrial capacity to do it isn't credible merely since everyone gets along at the summit.

Bolton:
Of course.

Gorka:
Then Trump forced a conversation NATO needed.

Bolton:
Yes.

I just said that.

Rhodes:
And I think critics should acknowledge it too.

European defense spending increasing substantially is a positive development.

The harder question is causation and cost.

How much of the increase came from Trump's pressure?

How much came from Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

How much came from Europeans independently concluding their security environment had changed?

Probably all three.

O'Brien:
That's fair.

But Trump was making this argument before the invasion.

Rhodes:
He was.

Rice:
And so were previous American presidents.

Gingrich:
But Trump made the consequences of ignoring the argument much more uncomfortable.

Rice:
Yes.

That's true.

Ian Bremmer:
This is exactly the conversation I wanted.

Nobody has to pretend Trump invented the burden-sharing issue.

Nobody has to pretend his pressure had nothing to do with changing European behavior.

So let me ask the deeper question.

What makes an alliance strong?

Military capability?

Trust?

Shared values?

Common enemies?

Economic interests?

Pompeo:
All of them.

But without capability, the rest becomes theoretical very quickly.

Rice:
And without trust, capability becomes much less useful.

Imagine you have an ally with an enormous military.

But you're not sure whether they'll actually come when you're attacked.

That's not a strong alliance.

Gorka:
Then the solution is both.

Rice:
Yes.

Gorka:
Which is why I reject this idea that demanding more from allies is inherently hostile to alliances.

If I tell my partner, "You need to be capable of doing your part," I'm not necessarily weakening the partnership.

I may be making it sustainable.

Applebaum:
Agreed.

The question is how you communicate that demand.

Gorka:
Sometimes politely asking for twenty years doesn't work.

Applebaum:
And sometimes humiliating a partner publicly creates resentment that lasts much longer than the negotiation.

Gorka:
Both can be true.

Ian Bremmer:
Robert, is Trump's NATO policy fundamentally transactional?

O'Brien:
It's more transactional than previous administrations, certainly.

But "transactional" has become an insult when it shouldn't always be.

All alliances contain transactions.

America provides capabilities.

Europe provides capabilities.

Countries provide bases.

They share intelligence.

They coordinate sanctions.

They purchase equipment.

They make commitments.

The problem comes when the transaction becomes one-sided.

Rhodes:
But NATO isn't a protection racket either.

O'Brien:
Of course not.

Rhodes:
Then there is something beyond the transaction.

The United States isn't defending Europe merely since Europeans buy American weapons.

America benefits from having democratic, prosperous, militarily capable countries aligned with us.

Those alliances expand American influence.

They give us bases.

They give us intelligence.

They give us diplomatic support.

They give us partners during crises.

So when we talk about what Europe "owes" America, we should remember America gets something too.

Pompeo:
Absolutely.

But that doesn't eliminate the obligation to contribute.

Rhodes:
Agreed.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's test the Trump doctrine against its own sovereignty principle.

Trump argues that America should resist supranational institutions that constrain American sovereignty.

Why shouldn't Denmark or Greenland say exactly the same thing when Washington pressures them?

Newt?

Gingrich:
They should.

That's what negotiation means.

America says, "Here are our interests."

Denmark says, "Here are ours."

Greenland says, "Here are ours."

Nobody is required to pretend those interests are identical.

Then you negotiate an arrangement everyone can live with.

The September agreement is interesting precisely since Greenland didn't become American.

The United States gained significant security arrangements.

Denmark retained sovereignty.

Greenland retained its political status.

That's negotiation.

Applebaum:
And if that becomes the model, I have much less objection.

My concern was always the possibility that sovereignty would be applied asymmetrically.

If American sovereignty is sacred but the sovereignty of smaller countries becomes negotiable whenever Washington wants something, that's not a sovereignty doctrine.

That's a hierarchy.

Bolton:
But let's not pretend all countries possess equal power.

They don't.

Applebaum:
I didn't say they did.

Bolton:
International relations involve unequal capabilities.

The purpose of rules and alliances isn't to eliminate that fact.

It's to structure how power gets used.

Rice:
Exactly.

And that's one reason institutions matter.

Ian Bremmer:
Let's go there.

Trump's UN speech was deeply critical of several international institutions, yet he praised the UN Security Council's cooperation where it supported American objectives.

Is Trump's position really anti-UN?

Mike?

Pompeo:
No.

It's anti-automatic deference.

There's a difference.

If an international organization helps solve a problem, work with it.

If it becomes ineffective, biased or disconnected from American interests, challenge it.

The institution doesn't become morally superior simply since it has an international name.

Rice:
That's a reasonable principle up to a point.

But institutions become valuable partly since countries accept rules even on days when those rules are inconvenient.

If every country participates only when an institution gives it the result it wants, you don't really have an institution anymore.

You have a meeting place.

Gorka:
Maybe some institutions should be meeting places.

Why should bureaucracies acquire authority over sovereign governments merely since they were created decades ago?

Rice:
They shouldn't automatically.

But consider aviation.

Shipping.

Telecommunications.

Nuclear inspections.

Disease surveillance.

Financial systems.

Modern civilization requires international rules.

You can't run global aviation through thirty bilateral phone calls every morning.

Gorka:
Nobody is proposing that.

Rice:
Then we're arguing over degree, not existence.

Gorka:
Yes.

Ian Bremmer:
Anne, let me challenge your side.

Critics of Trump often defend the international order.

But international institutions have sometimes failed badly.

The UN has been unable to stop numerous wars.

International organizations can become bureaucratic.

Security Council vetoes can paralyze action.

Some governments exploit institutions they don't genuinely respect.

Does Trump have a legitimate point that parts of the postwar system need serious reform?

Applebaum:
Yes.

Absolutely.

Defending international cooperation doesn't require defending every institution exactly as it exists.

Institutions can become ineffective.

They can become captured by competing interests.

They can become slow.

They can become disconnected from the problems they were designed to address.

Reform is legitimate.

My disagreement is with the idea that destroying institutional credibility automatically leaves America stronger.

Sometimes you discover what an institution was doing only after it disappears.

Gingrich:
That's fair.

Ian Bremmer:
Newt, strongest argument for the internationalist side?

Gingrich:
Predictability has economic and strategic value.

If America helped create a system that gives us enormous influence, we shouldn't casually destroy it simply since parts of it irritate us.

The better argument is to reform institutions aggressively where necessary.

Ian Bremmer:
Susan, strongest Trump argument?

Rice:
Allies should contribute substantially to their own defense.

And institutions should be judged partly by whether they actually accomplish their stated missions.

Those are legitimate demands.

Ian Bremmer:
Sebastian?

Gorka:
The strongest argument against our side is that pressure can become counterproductive if allies begin preparing for an America they believe they cannot rely upon.

That would hurt American interests.

Ian Bremmer:
Ben?

Rhodes:
Trump is right that diplomatic convention can sometimes preserve arrangements after their original logic has weakened.

Governments should be willing to ask whether an old policy still makes sense.

Ian Bremmer:
John?

Bolton:
Trump is right about European defense spending.

The criticism from my side is that alliances need clear strategic objectives, not merely higher numbers on a spreadsheet.

Ian Bremmer:
Robert?

O'Brien:
Trust matters.

You can't quantify it easily, but alliances run partly on confidence that commitments will survive political changes.

Ian Bremmer:
Anne?

Applebaum:
Trump has forced Europe to think much more seriously about its own defense capabilities. That conversation was necessary.

Ian Bremmer:
Mike?

Pompeo:
The internationalist argument is strongest when institutions multiply American strength rather than constrain it unnecessarily.

If twenty capable allies genuinely stand with America, that's obviously better than America standing alone.

Ian Bremmer:
Then I want to finish with one question.

Not about Trump.

Not about Biden.

Not Republican or Democrat.

Imagine you're advising an American president twenty years from now.

You can give that president only one sentence about alliances.

What do you say?

Gingrich:
Build alliances that make America and its partners stronger, and never confuse preserving the institution with accomplishing its purpose.

Rice:
Treat trusted allies as strategic assets whose value extends far beyond any single negotiation.

Pompeo:
An alliance is strongest when every member knows both that America will keep its commitments and that they must keep theirs.

Rhodes:
Don't measure America's leadership only by how many countries obey us; measure it by how many capable countries choose to stand with us.

O'Brien:
Make allies capable enough that collective defense means collective defense.

Applebaum:
Remember that trust can take decades to build and remarkably little time to damage.

Gorka:
Never ask Americans to carry indefinitely a burden that partners are capable of sharing.

Bolton:
Know exactly what the alliance exists to defend, and maintain the military capability to defend it.

Ian Bremmer:
Maybe that reveals something we couldn't see when this discussion began.

The disagreement isn't really alliances versus America First.

Everyone around this table believes alliances can serve American interests.

Everyone believes allies should contribute.

Everyone accepts that international institutions can fail.

Everyone accepts that trust has strategic value.

The real dispute is over the balance.

How much pressure strengthens an alliance before it begins weakening it?

How much sovereignty should countries surrender to make international cooperation work?

When does an institution multiply American influence, and when does it constrain America without producing enough in return?

Greenland gives Trump's supporters a substantial argument: after months of confrontation, the United States secured a significant Arctic security agreement without acquiring Greenland.

Trump's critics retain a substantial question: whether similar strategic gains could have been achieved with less damage to allied trust.

We cannot rerun history with a different negotiating strategy, so neither side can prove that counterfactual.

Perhaps the better test is what happens next.

If America emerges with stronger allies, greater military capability, deeper cooperation and countries that still want to stand beside it, Trump's pressure strategy will have evidence in its favor.

If allies spend more on defense yet increasingly build strategies around the possibility that America cannot be trusted, the numbers alone won't tell the whole story.

American strength isn't measured only by what the United States can do alone. Part of it is measured by what other capable nations are still willing to do with it.

Topic 5: How Should the Results of This Foreign Policy Be Judged?

This is an imagined discussion based on the participants' documented public positions, not a transcript of statements they actually made.

Ian Bremmer (Moderator):
We've spent four conversations debating Trump's foreign policy.

Now I want to remove something from the discussion.

Trump.

Not literally, of course. His decisions are what brought us here.

But I want to stop asking whether anyone likes Donald Trump.

I want to stop asking whether something sounds Republican or Democratic.

Imagine it's September 2036.

Ten years have passed.

There has been another presidential administration, perhaps several.

Iran has had ten years to respond to American military action and diplomacy.

Venezuela has had ten years to develop after Maduro.

The cartel strategy has had ten years to produce measurable results.

Europe has had ten years to meet its defense commitments.

The Greenland agreement has had ten years to operate.

We can see what happened to NATO.

We can see whether America's allies moved closer to Washington or further away.

We can see whether America's adversaries became more cautious or more aggressive.

So here's my first question.

What should Americans measure?

Not what should they feel.

What should they measure?

Newt Gingrich:
Start with war.

Did America fight fewer major wars?

Did fewer Americans die defending interests that could have been protected another way?

Were our adversaries less willing to attack us?

Then prosperity.

Did American economic strength increase?

Did our allies become stronger?

Did our adversaries become relatively weaker?

Then look at agreements.

Did they last?

That's important because politicians love announcing agreements.

The real question is what exists five or ten years afterward.

Susan Rice:
That's a good beginning.

I'd add alliances.

How many capable countries want close strategic relationships with the United States?

Not how many countries are dependent upon us.

How many actively choose us?

Look at intelligence cooperation.

Military interoperability.

Technology partnerships.

Trade.

Diplomatic coordination.

If countries have alternatives and still consistently choose Washington, that's evidence of American influence.

Sebastian Gorka:
I'd put Americans first.

How many Americans are being killed by foreign threats?

How much fentanyl is entering the country?

Are cartels stronger or weaker?

Are terrorist organizations capable of striking the homeland?

Can hostile states threaten Americans with nuclear weapons?

Those are things ordinary Americans can understand.

Ben Rhodes:
I'd add something less visible.

How many wars did we avoid?

That's difficult to measure, but it's important.

A president can look strong by launching an operation everyone sees on television.

Nobody watches the war that never happened.

Mike Pompeo:
True.

But deterrence is partly how you avoid wars.

Rhodes:
Agreed.

Pompeo:
Then we need to measure whether adversaries believed American warnings.

Did they cross lines after being warned not to?

Did military threats have to be carried out repeatedly?

If you're constantly using force to prove you're willing to use force, your deterrence may not be working as well as you think.

John Bolton:
That's exactly right.

Successful deterrence eventually reduces the frequency with which you need to demonstrate it.

Ian Bremmer:
Interesting.

So fewer military operations could actually demonstrate greater military credibility?

Bolton:
Potentially, yes.

If your adversaries change their behavior.

If they simply become stronger while you congratulate yourself for avoiding conflict, that's not deterrence.

Robert O'Brien:
Which is why you need several measurements simultaneously.

Peace by itself isn't sufficient.

You can have peace because your adversary is deterred.

Or you can have peace because you've surrendered every contested interest.

Those aren't equivalent.

Anne Applebaum:
And military superiority alone isn't sufficient either.

A country can possess overwhelming military strength and still lose political influence.

So I'd measure something else:

When a crisis occurs somewhere in the world, which country do other governments call?

Who convenes the meeting?

Whose intelligence do they trust?

Whose currency do they hold?

Whose technology do they use?

Whose universities do their children want to attend?

Whose political and economic system do people want to participate in?

Influence has many forms.

Ian Bremmer:
Good.

Let's apply those measurements.

Iran.

It's 2036.

What would tell us the policy succeeded?

Mike?

Pompeo:
Iran doesn't possess nuclear weapons.

Its ability to threaten American interests and allies has been substantially reduced.

Shipping routes remain open.

Any agreement is verifiable.

And American military forces aren't fighting another major war there.

Rice:
I can accept all of those.

I'd add that Iran isn't simply waiting for an opportunity to restart everything.

A sustainable settlement changes incentives.

Bolton:
That's where I remain skeptical.

If the same regime survives and retains the same strategic objectives, ten years of compliance may represent ten years of preparation.

Gingrich:
Maybe.

But John, you can't make regime change the only definition of success.

Bolton:
I'm not.

Gingrich:
Then imagine Iran in 2036.

No nuclear weapon.

No serious nuclear breakout capability.

Far less support for armed groups.

No attacks on shipping.

No attacks on Americans.

More normal economic relationships with neighboring countries.

Same basic government.

Success?

Bolton:
If those conditions are real and durable?

Yes.

Rhodes:
That's important.

Ian Bremmer:
Why?

Rhodes:
Since it means we have a measurement everyone can examine without first asking whether they support Trump.

That's what we've been trying to create throughout this conversation.

Ian Bremmer:
Venezuela.

Newt?

Gingrich:
Competitive elections.

Political prisoners largely a thing of the past.

Growing economy.

Oil production contributing to Venezuelan prosperity.

Fewer Venezuelans fleeing their country.

Stable relations with neighboring countries.

Reduced hostile foreign military influence.

Applebaum:
I'd add functioning institutions.

One election isn't democracy.

Can the opposition win?

Can the government lose?

Can journalists criticize leaders?

Can courts act independently?

If yes, then something meaningful happened.

Gorka:
I agree.

Ian Bremmer:
Sebastian, suppose all those things happen.

Would you call Venezuela successful even if the government elected in 2036 dislikes the United States?

Gorka:
Yes.

Ian Bremmer:
Really?

Gorka:
Certainly.

We're talking about national security, not requiring every country to elect a government that likes Washington.

If Venezuela isn't threatening Americans, isn't serving as a platform for hostile powers, isn't exporting instability, and Venezuelans freely choose their government, America doesn't need to control their politics.

Rice:
That's a principle worth keeping.

Ian Bremmer:
Cartels.

How do we judge that?

Gorka:
Easy.

Overdose deaths.

Drug flows.

Cartel revenue.

Territory controlled by criminal organizations.

Murders.

Corruption.

Weapons.

Human trafficking.

Measure all of it.

Rhodes:
And if military operations kill cartel leaders but overdose deaths barely change?

Gorka:
Then the strategy isn't succeeding sufficiently.

Rhodes:
Even if the operations themselves were tactically successful?

Gorka:
Yes.

Tactical success isn't automatically strategic success.

Pompeo:
That's true for almost everything we've discussed.

You can win every battle and fail to achieve the objective.

Ian Bremmer:
Greenland and NATO.

Anne?

Applebaum:
By 2036, I'd want to know whether European countries met their defense commitments.

Whether NATO's military capability increased.

Whether American Arctic security improved.

Whether Greenlanders themselves view the arrangement as beneficial.

Whether Denmark and the United States remain close allies.

And whether European governments still believe an American security commitment is reliable.

If all of those things are true, then even someone who disliked Trump's negotiating style would have to acknowledge significant positive results.

O'Brien:
That's fair.

Ian Bremmer:
Robert, reverse it.

Suppose NATO members spend dramatically more on defense.

But by 2036 Europe has developed military structures specifically designed to operate without America since European governments no longer trust Washington.

Success or failure?

O'Brien:
Mixed, leaning toward a strategic problem.

Higher European capability is good.

But if American policy pushed capable allies away from us unnecessarily, we'd have to count that as a cost.

Rice:
Thank you.

O'Brien:
Why are you thanking me?

Rice:
Since that's precisely the kind of answer this conversation needs.

O'Brien:
Fair enough.

Ian Bremmer:
Now I want to make this uncomfortable.

I'm going around the table.

Tell me one development that would cause you to reconsider your present assessment of Trump's foreign policy.

Not change your entire political philosophy.

Reconsider.

Newt?

Gingrich:
If America's adversaries become more aggressive rather than less after repeated demonstrations of American strength, I'd have to ask whether unpredictability had stopped deterring them and started encouraging instability.

Ian Bremmer:
Susan?

Rice:
If Trump's pressure-based diplomacy produces durable agreements, stronger allied defense capabilities, fewer wars and sustained cooperation with allies, I would have to give considerably more credit to the method than I presently would.

Ian Bremmer:
Mike?

Pompeo:
If allies begin systematically moving away from American security partnerships because they believe Washington has become unreliable, that would be serious evidence of a strategic cost.

Ian Bremmer:
Ben?

Rhodes:
If the use of limited military force repeatedly produces stable settlements without long occupations, expanding wars or recurring intervention, I'd have to reconsider some of my assumptions about the risks of Trump's coercive diplomacy.

Ian Bremmer:
Robert?

O'Brien:
If greater allied defense spending is accompanied by declining American influence and fragmented alliances, then burden sharing alone wouldn't demonstrate success.

Ian Bremmer:
Anne?

Applebaum:
If the Greenland agreement remains popular in Greenland and Denmark, strengthens Arctic security, blocks hostile strategic penetration and leaves NATO stronger, I'd acknowledge that the final outcome was substantially better than I feared from the earlier confrontation.

Ian Bremmer:
Sebastian?

Gorka:
If military pressure against cartels produces constant leadership replacements without materially reducing drugs, violence or American deaths, then military pressure alone clearly isn't sufficient.

Ian Bremmer:
John?

Bolton:
If Iran remains non-nuclear, substantially reduces its destabilizing behavior and complies with a verifiable agreement for a decade without regime change, then I'd have to reconsider how much political transformation was necessary to achieve the strategic objective.

Ian Bremmer:
That's probably the most important ten minutes we've had.

Every person at this table just identified evidence capable of challenging his or her own position.

That's much more useful than asking who "won."

But there's another question.

We've talked extensively about measurable results.

Foreign policy involves morality too.

Does the United States have responsibilities beyond protecting Americans?

Rice:
Yes.

Gorka:
Of course.

Bolton:
Certainly.

Ian Bremmer:
Interesting. Everyone is nodding.

Then where is the disagreement?

Gingrich:
Priority.

The American president's first responsibility is to Americans.

That doesn't mean the president has no responsibility toward anyone else.

America can defend religious freedom.

We can provide humanitarian assistance.

We can oppose genocide.

We can support political freedom.

But an American president isn't president of humanity.

Rhodes:
True.

But American interests and moral interests often overlap.

A world where governments can't simply invade neighbors is better for America.

A world where nuclear weapons don't proliferate is better for America.

A world where people aren't forced from their homes by wars is more stable.

Morality and national interest aren't always competitors.

Pompeo:
Agreed.

Applebaum:
There's another dimension.

America's values are part of its influence.

People around the world have historically distinguished between American governments and the American idea.

Freedom of speech.

Religious liberty.

Individual rights.

Rule of law.

Political competition.

If America abandons those ideas internationally, it gives up something other powers cannot easily reproduce.

Gorka:
I agree with the values.

My caution is against converting those values into a requirement that America militarily transform every government that violates them.

Applebaum:
I agree with that caution.

Bolton:
So does almost everyone.

The real argument is where the threshold lies.

Ian Bremmer:
Then let's talk about something we haven't discussed enough.

Cost.

A policy can achieve its objective and still cost too much.

How should Americans think about that?

O'Brien:
Opportunity cost.

Every aircraft carrier in one theater isn't somewhere else.

Every missile used has to be replaced.

Every dollar spent on one capability isn't spent on another.

Every hour of presidential attention devoted to one crisis isn't devoted to another.

Strategy means choosing.

Pompeo:
And sometimes spending more today prevents spending enormously more tomorrow.

Deterrence isn't free.

But war is vastly more expensive.

Rhodes:
Which cuts both ways.

An unnecessary intervention can create decades of costs.

Gingrich:
This is where I think Americans have become appropriately skeptical.

They aren't automatically isolationist.

They ask:

What's the objective?

How much will it cost?

How long are we staying?

What does success look like?

Those are healthy questions.

Rice:
They are.

And presidents of either party should have to answer them.

Ian Bremmer:
Now let's confront the personality issue directly.

We've tried very hard not to make this conversation a referendum on Donald Trump.

But some elements of his foreign policy clearly depend on Donald Trump himself.

Personal relationships.

Unpredictability.

His willingness to threaten extreme consequences.

His negotiating instincts.

His comfort changing positions rapidly.

Can Trumpism exist without Trump?

Newt?

Gingrich:
Parts of it certainly can.

Sovereignty.

Burden sharing.

Economic nationalism.

A stronger military.

Demanding measurable results from international organizations.

Using tariffs strategically.

Treating the Western Hemisphere as a serious national-security priority.

Those ideas don't require Donald Trump's personality.

Rice:
But personalized diplomacy does.

Gingrich:
Yes.

That's the part I would distinguish.

Rhodes:
And that's one of the biggest tests.

A durable doctrine has to be institutionalizable.

If only one person can operate it, it's a negotiating style rather than a complete foreign-policy doctrine.

Gorka:
Maybe.

But every doctrine reflects the president who creates it.

Reagan's foreign policy without Reagan wouldn't have looked identical.

Bolton:
True.

But institutions matter precisely since presidents leave.

The real question is which principles survive the individual.

Ian Bremmer:
So let's do something unusual.

I want each of you to imagine that the next president comes from the political party you least prefer.

What part of the Trump doctrine would you still want that president to keep?

Gingrich:
Demand results.

Rice:
Require allies to maintain serious defense capabilities.

Pompeo:
Maintain credible deterrence.

Rhodes:
Ask whether long-standing policies still serve their original purpose.

O'Brien:
Prioritize American interests clearly.

Applebaum:
Demand accountability from international institutions.

Gorka:
Protect the homeland aggressively.

Bolton:
Never let diplomacy become a substitute for strategy.

Ian Bremmer:
Now reverse it.

What principle should constrain any president, Republican or Democrat?

Gingrich:
Don't confuse action with success.

Rice:
Don't treat allies as disposable.

Pompeo:
Don't threaten consequences you aren't prepared to impose.

Rhodes:
Don't begin a war without knowing what you're trying to achieve afterward.

O'Brien:
Don't pretend American resources are unlimited.

Applebaum:
Don't spend decades of accumulated trust for a temporary political advantage.

Gorka:
Don't let fear of criticism prevent necessary action.

Bolton:
Don't let tactics substitute for objectives.

There was a brief silence.

Ian Bremmer:
That may be the closest this table has come to writing a bipartisan foreign-policy doctrine.

Gingrich:
Don't call it bipartisan. You'll ruin it.

A few people laughed.

Rice:
For once, Newt and I agree.

Rhodes:
We were doing so well.

Gorka:
Quick, somebody start an argument.

Bolton:
I can handle that.

The laughter lasted only a moment, but something in the room had changed.

For five conversations, these eight people had disagreed about military force, diplomacy, Iran, Venezuela, cartels, Greenland, NATO, sovereignty and international institutions.

Yet the final disagreement was no longer simply Trump versus anti-Trump.

Ian Bremmer:
I want one final answer from each of you.

No politician's name.

No political party.

One principle.

What should guide American foreign policy?

Gingrich:
Protect American interests through strength, but judge strength by what it accomplishes.

Rice:
Use American strength in ways that leave America with more capable partners, not fewer.

Pompeo:
Make diplomacy credible by maintaining the ability and willingness to defend American interests.

Rhodes:
Remember that avoiding an unnecessary war can be as consequential as winning a necessary one.

O'Brien:
Know what matters most and build enough strength to defend it.

Applebaum:
Preserve the combination of strength, alliances and trust that gives America influence beyond its military capabilities.

Gorka:
Make America's enemies understand our boundaries, and America's friends understand our commitments.

Bolton:
Define the objective before choosing the instrument.

Ian looked around the table.

Ian Bremmer:
Perhaps that is the fairest place to finish.

Ten years from now, Trump's foreign policy shouldn't be judged by how loudly his supporters defended it.

It shouldn't be judged by how intensely his opponents disliked it.

And it shouldn't be judged by whether the word Trump itself carries positive or negative meaning.

Judge the results.

Did Americans become safer?

Did America's adversaries become less capable of threatening it?

Did fewer major wars occur?

Did nuclear proliferation decline?

Did the Iran settlement, if one emerges, endure?

Did Venezuela become stable and freer?

Did cartel violence and drug deaths fall?

Did NATO become militarily stronger?

Did the Greenland arrangement strengthen Arctic security while respecting Greenland's political status?

Did America's allies remain allies because cooperation still served their interests?

Did American prosperity and technological leadership remain strong?

And when force was used, did it produce political results worth its human and economic cost?

Some of those answers may eventually vindicate Trump's supporters.

Others may vindicate his critics.

Some may produce uncomfortable answers for both.

That is precisely why they are better questions than asking which political team won the argument.

A foreign policy should eventually have to survive the hardest test of all: a world in which its results matter more than the name of the president who created it.

Final Thoughts 

Perhaps the most revealing result of this conversation was how quickly simple political categories began breaking down once specific policies were examined.

Trump is often described either as an isolationist or as an unusually aggressive president.

Neither description completely explains the foreign policy discussed here.

He is willing to use substantial military force.

He is equally willing to negotiate after using it.

He pressures allies but argues that stronger allies make alliances stronger.

He criticizes international institutions but works through them when he believes they serve American interests.

He emphasizes sovereignty while asserting that threats originating inside another sovereign country may sometimes require American action.

Those tensions do not automatically prove the doctrine right or wrong.

They reveal the questions by which it should be judged.

Iran

The central disagreement was not whether Iran should possess nuclear weapons. Everyone around the table opposed that outcome.

The disagreement concerned the method.

Can military force create the conditions for a durable agreement?

Could it instead convince Iran that only nuclear weapons can guarantee its security?

If an enforceable agreement permanently prevents an Iranian nuclear weapon without changing Iran’s government, would that be sufficient?

Even John Bolton, the strongest advocate for confronting the Iranian regime at the table, accepted that a genuinely durable transformation in Iranian behavior would matter.

Venezuela and the Cartels

Here the discussion confronted the boundary between security and sovereignty.

Trump’s supporters argued that borders cannot provide permanent protection to organizations capable of causing severe harm inside the United States.

His critics asked what happens if Washington creates a principle that other great powers later use to justify intervention in neighboring countries.

Yet common ground appeared again.

Destroying cartel leadership is not enough.

The real measurements are drug flows, overdose deaths, criminal revenue, territorial control, violence, corruption, and the strength of legitimate governments.

Venezuela presented the same lesson.

Removing Nicolás Maduro cannot by itself determine whether the policy succeeded.

The condition of Venezuela years afterward will tell us much more.

Greenland and NATO

This produced perhaps the most unexpected agreement.

Trump’s critics acknowledged that European allies should carry serious defense responsibilities.

His supporters acknowledged that trust between allies has strategic value.

That leaves an unresolved but much better question:

How much pressure makes an alliance stronger, and when does pressure begin damaging the relationship that gives the alliance its value?

Greenland may eventually provide part of the answer.

A stronger American Arctic position combined with respected Greenlandic sovereignty and healthy relations with Denmark would look very different in historical judgment from an arrangement that produced long-term resentment or division among allies.

The Larger Trump Doctrine

By the end of the discussion, several principles appeared repeatedly:

National sovereignty.

Military credibility.

Economic leverage.

Burden sharing.

Skepticism toward institutions that fail to produce results.

Negotiation backed by credible consequences.

Greater attention to the Western Hemisphere.

And a preference for measurable outcomes over diplomatic process.

Trump’s critics raised an equally important set of principles:

Clear objectives.

Durability.

Alliance trust.

Rules governing the use of force.

The political consequences following military victories.

The limits of American resources.

And the possibility that influence obtained voluntarily may sometimes be more durable than cooperation obtained through pressure.

These principles do not have to belong exclusively to either political party.

That may be the most useful conclusion of the entire discussion.

The fairest judgment of this foreign policy cannot be written in September 2026.

Some evidence exists now.

Much of the evidence does not.

A ceasefire can collapse.

An unpopular agreement can become remarkably successful.

A celebrated military victory can create problems years later.

A controversial negotiation can prevent a war nobody ever sees.

So perhaps Americans should keep a different scorecard.

Not:

Did Trump win?

Not:

Did Trump’s critics win?

But:

Are Americans safer?

Are America's adversaries less capable of threatening it?

Are fewer major wars being fought?

Has nuclear proliferation been contained?

Are cartels weaker and fewer Americans dying from their products?

Is Venezuela more stable and politically open?

Is NATO militarily stronger?

Are America's allies still choosing close partnership with the United States?

Has the Greenland arrangement improved Arctic security without sacrificing Greenlandic self-government?

When America uses military force, does the political result justify its cost?

A doctrine should eventually be able to survive those questions regardless of who occupies the White House.

And perhaps the strongest principle to emerge from eight people who disagree profoundly about Donald Trump was surprisingly simple:

Do not judge foreign policy by the personality of the president. Judge it by the world the policy leaves behind.

Short Bios:

Ian Bremmer is a political scientist, author, and founder of Eurasia Group. In this imagined conversation, he serves as the neutral moderator, pressing both sides to define objectives and measurable evidence.

Newt Gingrich is a former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, author, and longtime Republican political figure. He has strongly supported many elements of Trump’s America First approach while offering criticism of individual strategies.

Mike Pompeo served as U.S. Secretary of State and CIA director during Trump’s first administration. His foreign-policy arguments frequently emphasize deterrence, military credibility, economic pressure, and negotiations backed by leverage.

Robert O’Brien served as Trump’s National Security Advisor from 2019 to 2021. He has advocated strong American military capabilities, greater allied burden sharing, and an America First approach that remains internationally engaged.

Sebastian Gorka has served in Trump administrations in national-security and counterterrorism roles. He strongly supports treating powerful transnational criminal organizations and hostile groups as national-security threats rather than conventional criminal problems alone.

John Bolton served as U.S. National Security Advisor during Trump’s first administration and later became a prominent Trump critic. His hawkish foreign-policy perspective creates an important distinction in this discussion: some of his disagreements with Trump concern Trump not going far enough rather than opposing the use of American strength.

Susan Rice served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, National Security Advisor, and Domestic Policy Advisor during Democratic administrations. Her perspective emphasizes alliances, diplomacy, international cooperation, and sustained American leadership.

Ben Rhodes served as Deputy National Security Advisor during the Obama administration. He has been a prominent critic of military escalation and argues for clearly defined objectives, diplomacy, and careful consideration of the consequences following intervention.

Anne Applebaum is a historian and journalist whose work frequently examines democracy, authoritarianism, alliances, and international institutions. In this discussion, she brings particular attention to the long-term value of allied trust and institutional stability.